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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

A Study on the Effectiveness of the ISM Code on the
Seafarers' Awareness of Safety Culture

Degree:

MSc

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether the ISM Code is effective in
promoting maritime safety culture. This dissertation measures seafarers’ perceptions
of safety culture by distinguishing seafarers employed in ocean-going vessels
applying the Code from those in domestic vessels not applying the Code. Through a
comparison of the level of the consciousness of the two groups of seafarers on safety
culture, it is possible to verify the effectiveness of the Code on safety culture. The
dissertation assumes that the implementation of the Code impacts positively on safety
culture.
To measure seafarers’ awareness of safety culture, a questionnaire including 43
items based on seven safety culture indicators was developed through a review of the
relevant literature. A survey was conducted of Korean seafarers, and 208 responses
were used for analysis.
The result showed that there were significant differences between the perceptions
of safety culture between the two groups in organisational commitment, management
involvement, reporting system, learning and reward system, and it was confirmed that
the consciousness level of seafarers employed on ocean going vessels on these
factors was high. Nevertheless, there were no significant differences between the two
groups in employee empowerment and communication, so the Code could partly
affect safety culture.
In this dissertation, the effectiveness of the ISM Code was verified by quantitative
measurement of the perception of safety culture by Korean seafarers. This study is
meaningful because it carried out empirical measurement of safety culture and it is
expected that it can contribute to the establishment of measures to enhance safety
culture.
KEYWORDS: Safety culture, Safety climate, ISM, effectiveness, seafarer
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which was formally known as
the IMCO, was established in 1948, the IMO and its Member States have been
contributing to prevent accidents at sea through developing and improving rules and
regulations related not only to hardware such as ships’ hull design, stability and
equipment but also human resources such as seafarers. Although these efforts have
resulted in substantial improvements in the reliability of ships’ hardware as well as the
quality of crews, maritime incidents are still a major concern for the shipping
community (Rothblum, 2000; Ceyhun, 2014).
It has been shown in many studies that more than 80% of maritime accidents are
caused by human error, for instance, failure of situational awareness, mistakes, slips
and violations of regulations by crews on ships. However, at a deeper level, it can be
seen that there are problems with organizational climate and management (KTSA,
2008).
From the late 1980s to the 1990s, major catastrophes occurred at Sea, for instance,
the Herald of Free Enterprise, a ro-ro passenger ferry, capsized in the Dover Strait
with loss of 193 lives in 1987, the Exxon Valdez, a very large crude oil tanker,
grounded in Alaska in 1989, and another ro-ro passenger ferry, the Estonia, sank in
the Baltic Sea with loss of 852 lives and only 137 survivors in 1994 (Jung, 2016).
Through the analysis of these accidents, it is understood that human error was the
direct cause (Lee, 2016). At the same time, it has been found through accident
1

investigations that deficiencies in safety culture lie in the management of companies'
employees and ships’ crews (Lappalainen, 2016). These accidents remind the
international community of the importance of the human element and the need to
promote safety culture to ensure maritime safety.
With the perception of the importance of the safety culture in the maritime sector,
the IMO has established measures to promote safety culture on ships. In 1994, the
International Safety Management System (ISM) Code was implemented by the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and was promoted by
the IMO with the safety culture on the maritime industries including ships and in ship
owners (IMO, 2013; Anderson, 2015). In August 2016, the Secretary-General of IMO
deemed that the Code was considered as the measure designed to directly influence
maritime safety culture at a conference in Singapore (IMO, 2016).
The IMO set the objective of the ISM Code “to ensure safety at sea, prevention of
human injury or loss of life and avoidance of damage to the marine environment (IMO,
1993, p.5)”. The Code includes provisions for establishing Safety Management
System (SMS) to ships and ship owners to prevent human errors by assessing and
identifying all risks and managing them.
According to the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the safety culture can be
described as “the values and practices that management and personnel share to
ensure that risks are always minimized and mitigated to the greatest degree possible.
(ICS, 2013, p.2)” The safety culture makes employees of shipping companies possible
to improve their behaviour by allowing them to think and act based on safety and
share a value of safety; thereby, it can bring enhancement of safety. Furthermore, the
safety culture is essential for ships operation that is constantly exposed to potential
risks, and it also an essential virtue required for personnel performing on-board
operations and staff working for shipping companies.
The safety culture was considered very important not only in the shipping sector
but also in other industries. Prior to the introduction of safety culture in the maritime
sector, the term “safety culture” was first used by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) following the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. In the aviation
field, safety culture has been studied since the NASA Challenger accident in 1986
2

and the Continental Express Flight 2574 accident in 1991 (von Thaden & Gibbons,
2008). Therefore, several studies have been carried out to assess safety culture,
focusing on aviation pilots and traffic management operators.
In order to improve maritime safety, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of
the detailed concepts of safety culture and establish a concrete approach to the safety
culture. Therefore, a tool to assess the perception of safety culture can be a good
measure to understand the characteristics of an organization, and make it possible to
find a specific prescription to enhance safety culture.
Seafarers should work based on the perception that safety is the best way to
prevent human error. It can be prevented by crews having high alertness about safety
and an organizational culture should be promoted. Therefore, assessing seafarers’
awareness of safety culture can be a more active measure to prevent accidents on
ships. In order to survey the awareness of the safety culture of the seafarers, it is
important to apply an adequate tool that can be assessed quantitatively using
reasonable indicators, and there are several studies to estimate seafarers’ awareness
of safety culture.
With regard to the ISM Code, there is a question to whether the application of the
Code has improved the awareness of safety culture of ship workers. As the Code has
been enforced over the last two decades, many research and studies have evaluated
the effectiveness of the ISM code. The IMO has also studied the impact of the ISM
Code, which was introduced at eighty-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) in 2006 (IMO, 2016). The study (IMO, 2005) found that the Code contributed
to the enhancement of safety culture with positive benefits, and one of the
recommendations was that further study was needed for the improvement of the Code
reflecting safety culture. However, there were some studies relating negative effects
of the Code. For instance, Bhattacharya (2012) argued that there were substantial
gaps between seafarers’ and managers’ perception on the Code (Jung, 2016).
In the above previous studies, the perceived effectiveness of the ISM Code was
measured by asking respondents’ opinions about the implementation of the Code
through interviews or questionnaires. However, this study will develop a questionnaire
based on indicators for measuring safety culture, and the effectiveness of the Code
3

will be measured specifically based on the indicators by conducting surveys targeting
crews working on the Code applied ships and non-applied ships.
Through this study, it is possible to understand the perception of the safety culture
of seafarers, and to measure the level of safety culture on ships that apply and do not
apply the ISM Code, so that the effectiveness of the ISM to the safety culture can be
estimated. Furthermore, it is possible to compare and analyse its effectiveness based
on the safety indicators, and it will be possible to identify the factors that need
improvement to enhance the performance of ISM.

1.2 Objectives

This study aims to show a correlation between seafarers’ awareness of safety
culture and ISM Code. Specifically, it aims to establish whether seafarers who are
working on ships applying the ISM Code have a high level of consciousness of safety
culture. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Code in terms of promoting safety
culture will be assessed based on indicators. In addition, the perception of the safety
culture of seafarers will be compared and analysed based on the indicators by
distinguishing crews working on the Code applied and non- the Code applied vessels.
For that purpose, the concept of safety culture will be examined in this study and
optimum tool will be developed to assess seafarers’ perception of maritime safety
culture. Therefore, this dissertation:


Studies the concept of safety culture by examining past studies in the
aviation field and shipping industry.



Collects safety indicators for the assessment of safety culture based on
past similar studies of aviation and the maritime sector.



Analyses elements of the ISM Code and the safety culture indicators, and
develops optimum safety indicators, and develops a questionnaire based
on the safety indicators.



Surveys more than two hundred Korean seafarers who are working on
4

international and domestic ships using questionnaires. And analyses the
results using SPSS.


Analyses the characteristics of the awareness of Korean seafarers and
examines the correlation between ISM and the safety culture.

1.3 The structure of the dissertation

This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one includes the background, the
objectives and the structure of the thesis.
Chapter two will conduct a literature review related to the development of the
concept of safety culture and relevant research to assess safety culture in the aviation
and maritime fields. Furthermore, studies in terms of the effectiveness of the ISM
Code will be reviewed.
Chapter three will examine the background, the role and the function of the ISM
Code and elements of the Code. In addition, the implementation of the Code in Korea
will be shown.
Chapter four will show the hypothesis and the methodology for this study. As the
main hypothesis, the correlation between safety culture and the ISM will be suggested.
With this hypothesis, other sub-hypotheses will be added in order to grasp the
characteristics of Korean seafarers' perceptions of safety culture. Moreover, the
design of the questionnaire will be shown in this chapter.
Chapter five contains an empirical analysis, which describes the characteristics of
the data, evaluation of measurement items, and hypothesis testing. The collected
questionnaires are analysed by using IBM SPSS Statistic 20, and analysis of
frequencies, factors, reliabilities and t-test are conducted in order to enhance the
objectivity of the research.
Chapter six will provide the discussion of findings, conclusion, and limitation of the
study and future topics.
5

Figure 1 Process of the study
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2. THEORETICAL REVIEW OF SAFETY CULTURE

2.1 Historical background of safety culture

The term safety culture was first introduced in the report of the Post-Accident
Review Meeting written after the Chernobyl Accident by the International Nuclear
Safety Group in 1986. According to the report, the IAEA indicated that the major cause
of the nuclear power station accident was derived from a “poor safety culture” in the
Soviet Union (IAEA, 1991).
Following the Chernobyl accident, a series of several major catastrophes occurred,
for instance, a fire on the King’s Cross underground in 1987 and an explosion on the
oil production platform, Piper Alpha, in 1988. The main causes of these accidents
were also referred to as poor safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998: KTSA,
2008). Meanwhile, the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1987 brought
attention to safety culture in aviation. In addition, the Continental Express Flight 2574
crash occurred in 1991, also raising concerns about safety culture (von Thaden &
Gibbons, 2008). The NTSB (1991) noted that “The failure of Continental Express
Flight 2574’s management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and
enforced

adherence

to

approved

maintenance

and

quality

assurance

procedures”(p.54). Since this accident, the commercial aviation industry has
conducted a number of studies related to safety culture (von Thaden & Gibbons,
2008).
7

In the maritime field, safety culture has also begun to be recognized following a
number of large-scale marine accidents, just as in the other industries. On 6th March
1987, the ro-ro passenger ferry Herald of free enterprise capsized in four minutes just
after its departure, and there was a loss of 193 lives. This catastrophe brought about
full attention to safety culture in the maritime industry. Gill and Wahner (2012) and
Lappalainen (2016) indicated that the Herald of free enterprise, which was operated
by Townsend Car Ferries Limited, had a lack of safety culture among the ship’s crews
as well as the shore-based management. Moreover, the shore-side managers of the
ferry had always forced the crew to leave five minutes early from ports. On the day of
the incident, there was a hasty departure due to delayed shipments. At the time of the
departure of the ferry, the chief officer should have confirmed that the bow door of the
ship was closed. However, due to the climate of the company's management to make
a fast departure, he had to be on the navigational bridge. This climate of the
company’s management resulted in the chief officer’s mistake of failing to ensure that
the bow door was closed. Several months before the accident occurred, the master
asked the manager of the shipping company to install a means to indicate the closed
or open position of the bow doors, but the communication between the shore-based
manager and the master was not effective. It resulted from the corporate culture that
seeks to benefit rather than protect (Gill & Wahner, 2012).
Seven years following the Herald of Free Enterprise accident, another serious
maritime accident that raised awareness about safety culture occurred in the Baltic
Sea. On 28 September 1994, the car ferry Estonia capsized and sank due to a
separation of its bow visor in the rough sea. From the accident, 852 people died or
were missing and only 137 people survived. The direct cause was the separation of
the bow visor, which pulled off the watertight ramp behind it. After that, a huge amount
of water flooded into the ferry. According to the report of the Joint Accident
Investigation Commission (1997), prior to the Estonia accident, there had been
numerous failures involving bow visors on similar types of ships, which were
constructed at similar times, including one of the Estonia’s sister ships. However,
there had been no systematic remedies for existing ro-ro passenger ferries. Since
information or reports about those failures were not shared, the crew and master of
the Estonia were unaware of the potential dangers to the bow visor closure (JAIC,
8

1997).
Safety culture has been introduced and studied to ensure safe working environment
and to prevent an accident as an important concept to manage risks in various
industries (Berg, 2013). It is clear that the importance of safety culture gains
recognition following a major disaster in any industry. If a safety culture is lacking in
any organisation, such as a ship or a company, it would be very difficult to manage
risk factors, and the lack of management can lead to major accidents.

2.2 Concept of safety culture and safety climate

The definition of safety culture has been studied since the 1980s following the
occurrence of the Chernobyl disaster. Firstly, the IAEA (1991) defined safety culture
as “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations
and individuals which establish that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. (p.4)” Since then, there
have been many areas that deal with safety culture; however, there has been no
consensual definition of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Wiegmann, Zhang, von
Thaden, Sharma & Mitchell, 2002). Many attempts have been made to define safety
climate, along with studies on the definition of safety culture.
Zhang, Wiegmann, and von Thaden (2002) conducted comprehensive reviews on
the concept of safety culture, along with safety climate, to better understand safety
culture. The study analysed a total of 107 documents and papers, and 30 articles
related to safety culture and safety climate.
According to the study (Zhang et al. 2002), safety culture was defined as the flowing:
The enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in
every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety; act to
preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns; strive to actively learn,
adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behaviour based on lessons
9

learned from mistakes; and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.
(p. 1406)
Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2002) defined safety climate as the flowing:
The temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among
individual perceptions of the organization. It is therefore situationally based,
refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is
relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of the
current environment or prevailing conditions. (p.1406)
Bhattacharya (2015) argued that there were differences between the concepts of
safety culture and safety climate. Safety culture comes from inherent historical
contexts or organizational operations, values, and traditions, and is formed over a
long period (Cooper, 2000). On the other hand, safety climate is affected by the
environment and the situation. By analogy, the safety climate can be relatively
unstable and instantaneous, with the concept of a snapshot of the safety culture
(Bhattacharya, 2015).
Safety culture is an inherent belief in a somewhat deeper core shared among its
members and is expressed through a safety climate. In other words, if the safety
climate is the environment in which the organization is located at that time, the safety
culture is the nature of the organization (Cox & Flin, 1998). Therefore, most of the
facts about safety culture are also true of safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000; Oltedal,
2011).
To sum up, safety climate has been assessed in many other studies. Measuring the
current safety climate will identify a cross-section of the safety culture that the
contemporary society or organisation has. By diagnosing the current state, it is
believed that it will be possible to grasp what elements the current organisation or
society has and what elements it can improve. Therefore, the safety culture should be
recognised through measuring the safety climate in an organisation or society

10

2.3 ISM Code and safety culture

According to the ISM Code, Ship Management System (SMS), which refers to a
structured and documented system designed to ensure that a company’s employees
can implement its policies for the safe operation of ships and the protection of the
marine environment (IMO, 2013), shall be applied to ships. Moreover, the IMO
encourages the establishment of a safety culture in the shipping sector through the
establishment of the SMS (Anderson, 2015; IMO, 2013; Kongsvik, Størkersen, &
Antonsen, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010).
The question has been raised as to what constitutes a good safety culture.
Promoting safety culture can be effective to enhance the safety of an organisation
(Lee, 2012). Wiegmann et al. (2002) identified the following features as to what is a
“good” safety culture (Lappalanine, 2016). There are five organisational indicators of
safety culture: “organizational commitment, management involvement, employee
empowerment, reward systems, and reporting system” (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p.11).
The organizational commitment means upper-level management to promote safety
culture. Practically, it entails a persistent attitude to safety, and adequate funding and
allocation of resources for the development and implementation of safety (Wiegmann
et al., 2002).

Figure 2 Indicators of safety culture
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Management involvement refers to the degree to which senior management and
middle managers are directly involved in important safety activities within the
organization. This includes good communication between the top and bottom
(Wiegmann et al., 2002).
Employee empowerment is the last defence to prevent errors by preventing worker
errors (e.g. pilot) in the field. Organizations that have a good safety culture should
delegate authority to employees to encourage them to actively participate and play
an important role in promoting safety (Wiegmann et al., 2002).
Eiff (1999, p. 17) indicated that “One of the foundations of a true safety culture is
that it is a reporting culture.” The reporting system is a system for reporting
incompatible elements and errors. It focuses on whether employees are encouraged
to report safety issues without any difficulties, and whether they are well
communicated (Wiegmann et al., 2002).
The reward system is necessary to establish an organizational culture, and both
safe acts and unsafe acts need to be evaluated. A fair evaluation system will promote
safety culture. Organizations with a good safety culture should look to ensure that the
distinction between safe and unsafe behaviour is clear and has a clear and correct
system of punishment (Wiegmann et al., 2002).
Lappalainen (2016) argued that the list of indicators developed by Wiegmann et al.
(2002) does not clearly present a “continuous improvement process”, but stated that
the reporting and rewarding system could be used as a practical tool for that purpose.
Furthermore, Lappalainen (2016) indicated that there is no doubt that the
characteristics of a good safety culture are implemented in the Code like a religious
position.
Since the implementation of the ISM Code in 1994, considerable research has been
conducted to study the effectiveness of the ISM code for improving maritime safety.
This maritime safety promotion is also closely linked to the improvement of maritime
safety culture. This is because the IMO anticipated that the ISM Code would enhance
the safety culture of ship and ship owners (IMO, 2016).
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A group of experts set up by the IMO surveyed to measure the effectiveness of the
ISM Code, and a total of 3,109 respondents answered the questionnaire (IMO, 2005).
An analysis by the expert groups showed that the ISM Code worked properly on ships
and in shipping companies and improved maritime safety management positively.
Furthermore, it showed that safety culture was promoted by implementing the ISM
Code as the majority of respondents (96 to 99 percent) evaluated the ISM Code
positively. However, the expert group noted that the survey was voluntary so
respondents who participated in the survey had a positive attitude toward the ISM
Code. Therefore, the survey had a limitation, whereby an overwhelmingly positive
evaluation would have been made due to respondents who had positive attitudes to
the survey (IMO, 2005).
Although the IMO determined that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Code
was positive, there have been several studies to suggest the implementation of the
Code has negative aspects (Lappalainen, 2016). Bharttacharya (2011) indicated that
managers had been bureaucratically applying the ISM Code by directing and
enforcing guidelines to crew members in a top-down manner in implementing safety
management. The crews applied their own experiences rather than using the ISM
Code to conduct safe shipboard operations (Bhattacharya, 2012). These are the
reasons why the effectiveness of the Code seems to be negative in the study. Besides,
Anderson (2003) argued that the Code requires a lot of documentation on the part of
seafarers, so it can be burdensome and complex, and Knudsen (2009) and Batalden
and Sydnes (2014) noted that documents and procedures under the ISM Code are
effectively applied to real work of seafarers. In addition, Bhattacharya (2012) noted
that there was a considerable difference in the recognition of the crew members and
the ship managers about the performance and execution of the ISM Code.
A recent study conducted interviews and observation on personnel's conceptions
of SMS and safety culture. Lappalainen (2016) scrutinised the views of personnel on
the impact of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture. As a result, perception of
safety culture was influenced by the ISM Code, but the effect seemed not to be strong.
Some interviewees had positive thinking on the SMS, and believed that the
implementation of ISM Code brought substantial benefits (Lappalainen 2016).
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However, there were negative views on the effectiveness of incident reporting and
documentation.
In Korea, the safety culture of seafarers has not been comprehensively studied. A
survey of seafarers' perceptions about safety culture was conducted. Kim (2013)
found that there were no differences in safety culture awareness among seafarers of
different ship types and ranks, and the main survey items were related to the
responsibility and attitude toward safety of seafarers. Furthermore, compliance with
the ISM Code can contribute to the promotion of safety culture.
In summary, most studies that have been conducted in the past have been related
to the definition and concept of safety culture, and there have been few studies on the
relationship between Safety Culture and the ISM Code (Guldenmund, 2010:
Lappalainen, 2016). In addition, research on the effectiveness of the ISM Code itself
has been conducted, but studies on whether it contributes to safety culture are not
sufficient. In particular, there are no studies that quantitatively measure the
effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture.

2.4 Approaches and related studies to assess safety culture

Since safety culture is covered in many fields such as nuclear power, road, railway,
manufacturing and aviation, various research and evaluation methods exist.
Furthermore, due to the importance of safety culture, many studies have been
conducted to define and to assess safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2002). Therefore,
there is no standardised measurement tool that can be applied to all industrial fields
(Cox & Flin, 1998).
To research safety culture, there have been many ways to evaluate safety culture
depending on the approach. Guldenmund (2010) indicated three approaches to the
research of safety culture as shown in Table 1. First, the analytical approach is
commonly applied to an assessment of safety culture, and questionnaires are utilised
for this approach. Second, a pragmatic approach aims to assess the maturity of the
safety culture of an organisation and tries to find a way to improve the current status
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of the culture. The last approach is an academic approach which is mainly conducted
as a qualitative study, and it aims to grasp the status of a culture through interviews,
observations and document studies (Guldenmund, 2010).
In recent years, combining these three approaches has been considered as useful
in interpreting the concept of safety culture and understanding the safety
management system. It would not be accurate to say that one method is perfect. By
combining these approaches, one might be able to interpret the concepts of safety
culture and apply them usefully to understanding the safety management system
(Guldenmund, 2010).
As to methods of measurement of safety culture, Wiegmann et al. (2002) indicated
that they could be practically divided into qualitative and quantitative methods as
shown in Table 2. On the one hand, qualitative methods can be comprised of
employee observation, focus group discussion, historical information review, and case
studies. Through qualitative methodologies, deep and intensive information can be
obtained based on the content discussed (Wiegmann et al., 2002). On the other hand,
the quantitative approach measures safety culture by using standardized and
coordinated procedures - interviews, surveys and questionnaires (Wiegmann et al.,
2002). The culture can be assessed through a questionnaire, including safety factors
or indicators, and it is easy to acquire people’s perceptions of the culture.
Table 1 Guldenmund (2010)'s approaches for study on safety culture edited by author
Approach

objectives

Tools & methodology

Feature

Analytical

Psychological safety
climate

Questionnaires

Grasping the
present culture

Assessment of the
safety culture maturity
of an organisation

Q-sort or rating scales for
making appraisals

Understanding or
describing a culture

Interviews, case study,
observations or
documentation

Pragmatic

Academic

- Quantitative methodology

Experiencebased approach

Expert opinions
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Focusing on
core of the
culture

- Qualitative methodology

Each method has advantages and disadvantages. The qualitative approach can
analyse and answer the internal factors through an in-depth approach to the questions
and discussions, while the results can be biased according to the analyst's opinion.
The quantitative approach can analyse the perception of the climate objectively by
asking the opinions of the respondents through standardized questionnaires; however,
it is difficult to analyse the responses of the participants in depth.
To assess safety climate, safety dimensions such as factors are needed. There
have been several studies for developing tools to evaluate the level of safety culture
in the aviation sector. The Korea Transportation Safety Authority [KTSA] (2008)
conducted an assessment of safety culture and developed an index of safety culture
for measuring the safety culture awareness level of aviation pilots. The survey
developed a questionnaire utilizing the commercial aviation safety survey (CASS)
scale which was developed by Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharman, and Gibbon
(2003). Furthermore, the study utilised the indicators which were organisation
commitment, management involvement, reward system, employee empowerment
and reporting system. The CASS’s questionnaire originally contained 86 questions,
but the KTSA limited their questionnaire to 46 questions due to realistic constraints
such as pilots’ hectic schedule.

Table 2 Measurement of safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2002; Lee, 2012)
Division

Tools & Methodologies
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Qualitative Measurement

Quantitative measurement

-

Observation

-

Focus group discussion

-

Historical Information review

-

Case study
-Structured interview
-Questionnaire
-Q-sorts

Wang and Sun (2012) proposed a new index system for safety culture evaluation
and showed its effectiveness and application for the assessment of safety culture at
intrinsic and extrinsic levels, with seven sub-culture components: priority,
standardizing, flexibility, learning, teamwork, reporting and just culture. Their survey,
using a questionnaire, was carried out targeting a local aviation operator in Tanjin,
China.
Song (2014) assessed safety climate in the aviation sector, targeting 30 traffic
management operators and 25 pilots using a questionnaire with 50 questions. Safety
factors developed by the Civil Air Navigation Service Organisation (CANSO) were
utilised in the study. The factors were management skill, attitude, resource
management, learning, communication, organisational structure, and management of
change.
With regard to studies on assessment of maritime safety culture, Ek, Runefores and
Borell (2013) conducted a study to assess the safety culture of six passenger ships.
The study developed nine aspects of safety culture: flexibility, risk perception,
behaviour, reporting, work situation, justness, attitudes, learning, communication and
safety culture. The study presented the relationships between the nine aspects though
using a questionnaire targeting crew working onboard the passenger ships.
Bhattacharya (2015) carried out research to grasp the difference in perception of
safety culture between seafarers, shore managers and ship owners. Among the
seafarers, junior and senior officers' perception was also compared. In this study, five
experts participated in the development of a questionnaire, and finally, all 19 items
were used for the measurement of safety. In addition, the study analysed the
correlation between the 19 items and seven safety drivers which were support on
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safety, organisation support, resource availability, work environment, job demands,
just culture and safety compliance.
Moreover, Arslan, Kurt, Turan and Wolff (2016) determined that safety culture could
be scored on ten safety factors to assess safety culture for maritime organisations.
The factors were developed based on the index for measuring safety culture
developed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 2012). The factors were
communication, employer employee trust, feedback, involvement, mutual trust,
problem identification, promotion of safety, responsiveness, safety awareness and
training and competence. They utilised the index of ABS’s model as a basis for their
questionnaire. To develop the questionnaire, a meticulous literature review was
carried out, and the developed questionnaire, including 85 questions, was tested by
experts. The survey was administered to both shore staff and crew members.
The above-listed studies mainly used a quantitative methodology, and it was found
that various dimensions of safety culture were utilized for the survey. Table 3
summarizes the safety-related dimensions used in the studies. It can be seen that
various dimensions have been utilised in the aviation and maritime sectors.

Division

Study

Survey target

Dimensions or features

Aviation

KTSA (2008)

248 pilots

Organisation commitment,
management involvement, reward
system, employee empowerment and
reporting system.

Wang & Sun
(2012)

123 civil aviation
operators

Priority, standardizing, flexible,
learning, teamwork, reporting and
just culture

Song (2014)

30 traffic
management
operators and 25
pilots

Skill, attitude, resource management,
learning, communication,
organisational structure,
management of change.

Ek
et
(2013)

528 seafarers on six
Swedish passenger
ships

Flexibility, risk perception, behaviour,
reporting, work situation, justness,
attitudes, learning, communication
and safety culture

Shipping
Sector

al.
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Bhattacharya
(2015)

433 Indian seafarers

Safety, organisation support, resource
availability, work environment, job
demands, just culture and safety
compliance.

Arslan, Kurt,
Turan
and
Wolff (2016)

70 respondents of
shore staffs and
seafarers

Communication, employer employee
trust, feedback, involvement, mutual
trust, problem identification,
promotion of safety, responsiveness,
safety awareness and training and
competence.

ABS (2012)

This was published
as guidance for a
survey

Communication, empowerment,
feedback, mutual trust, problem
identification, promotion of safety,
responsiveness, safety awareness

Table 3 Summaries of safety culture dimensions edited by the author

3. ISM CODE

In the previous chapter, a relationship of the ISM Code and safety culture was
reviewed. A concept and a structure of the Code will be shown in this chapter.
Furthermore, the current stage of the implementation of the ISM Code carried out and
the problems faced by Korean shipping, such as a status of maritime accidents, will
be explained.

3.1 The concept of the ISM Code

For an importance of human factor and a promotion of a safety culture in the
maritime sector, the ISM Code was adopted by resolution A.741 (18) at the 18th
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General Assembly of the IMO in 1993. At first, however, the Code was not a
mandatory measure. Therefore, the IMO has enforced the Code through the
establishment of Chapter 9 of the 1974/78 SOLAS Convention for the full and
immediate implementation of the ISM Code in May 1994. Since 1998, the ISM Code
has been phased into all the ratifying countries of the 1974/78 SOLAS Convention,
and since July 1, 1998, all passenger ships and over 500 tons of oil tankers, chemical
tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and high-speed cargo ships. In addition, the Code
has been applied to mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) over 500 tons since 1 July
2002 (IMO, 2013).
The ISM Code requires shipping companies to establish a safety management
system for offshore department and ships and maintain their level above certain
international standards. To this end, direct involvement of top management in the
company and the responsibilities, abilities, Motivation is being encouraged. The SMS
in the Code is used in the ISO 9000 family of quality management systems. In other
words, while the ISO 9000 family quality management system is intended to improve
the quality of the product, the SMS aims to ensure safety of ships and prevention of
marine pollution. These objectives have pursued through software including Quality
Management System (QMS) and SMS (MLTM, 2010).
In addition, according to the Code, the flag state or the Recognised Organisation
(RO) issues to the shipping company to ensure good SMS after the audit. A Document
of Compliance (DOC) is issued to the ship owner and a Safety Management
Certificate (SMC) is issued to the ship. The Code is implemented through periodical
audit, and the contents of the SMS and the validity of the certificate is checked in the
inspection of the Port State Control (PSC).
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According to the Code, establishing a SMS shall be documented in the form of
procedures or manuals for all duties of vessels and shore based operations carried
out for safe navigation of ships. Furthermore, it is institutionalised so that the main
duties may be carried out by the documented system. It means establishing a system
that can check the implementation processes and identify irrelevant matters for
correcting defects. Therefore, it is ideal that the system document has a hierarchical
structure as shown in figure 3. Furthermore, twelve elements have been established
as mandatory in the part A of the ISM Code as following Table 4.

Manuals

Procedures

Instructions
Figure 3 Layer of document of safety management system
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Table 4 Elements of ISM Code (IMO, 2013)
Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Title of each element
Safety and environmental policy
Company responsibility and authority
Designated persons
Master’s responsibility and authority
Resource and personnel
Shipboard operations
Emergency preparedness
Reports and analysis of Non-Conformities, accidents
and hazardous occurrences
Maintenance of the ship and equipment
Documentation
Company verification, review and evaluation

3.2 Implementation of the ISM Code in Korea

With the enforcement of the ISM Code, the Korean government revised the
Maritime Traffic Safety Act on Feb. 8, 1999 to establish the safety management
system over ships flying the Korean flag and ship owners. The procedures for the
SMS were in Section 2 of the Act. In the SOLAS Convention, the ISM Code is applied
to all passenger ships engaged on international voyages, oil tankers, gas carriers,
chemical carriers, bulk carriers and high-speed cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and
above, and this application standard was reflected in in the Korean Maritime Traffic
Safety Act. On June 15, 2011, the Act was revised and promulgated to the Maritime
Safety Act (MLTM, 2010).
According to Article 46 of the Act, the Minister of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) shall
establish and manage policies for a ship owner and ships through the establishment
of the SMS to enhance safe operation of the ship. The implementation of the ISM
Code in Korea aims to maintain the level of safety management of ship owners and
vessels above certain international standards, and calls for direct participation of top
management in the enterprise as well as the responsibility, competence, attitude and
motivation of all stakeholders. However, such a purpose will be achieved on vessels
engaged in international voyages. This is because a more simplified SMS is applied
to vessels engaged in domestic voyages. Therefore, for domestic vessels, an SMS
that meets international standards does not apply.
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Since the oil spill accident of the Very Large Crude Oil Carrier (VLCC) Hebei sprit,
caused by a collision of crane barges towed by tugs on Dec. 7, 2007, there was a
recognition of the necessity to apply the SMS to barges. Therefore, the relevant
domestic regulation has been more stringently enforced compared to SOLAS.
According to the Act, barges over 3,000 gross tons or tugs towing with lines more than
100 meters were included in the scope of the application of the SMS. Therefore, the
application of the Act is as follows (NLIC, 2015).
a) Ships engaged in maritime passenger transportation business (except for the
domestic passenger transport business and the inner port passenger transport
business)
b) Vessels of at least 500 gross tons (including barges tightly combined with
steamers), which engage in marine cargo transportation services, and other
vessels as prescribed by the Presidential Decree
c) Carriers transporting catches of fish and mobile offshores with a gross tonnage
of 500 tons or more engaged in international voyages
d) Wig crafts
Furthermore, the Korean SMC shall contain the eleven elements in accordance with
Article 46 (4) of the Act. However, under Article 15 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of
the same Act, a simplified SMS can be established in the case of a domestic vessel,
through exempting some of the 11 elements. As the ISM code was legislated to the
domestic Act, the elements of the Code were thoroughly reflected in the Act.
Ships and ship owners applying the ISM Code should be audited to prove that an
SMS is well maintained. In Korea, the audit procedure has been established in Article
48 of the Act. According to the Act, the audits for vessels engaged in international
voyages are carried out by the Korean Register of shipping (KR) as a RO, and the
audits for ships engaged mainly in domestic voyages are handled directly by the
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Regional Offices (MAFRO). Table 5 shows the results
of certification audit for Korean shipping companies.
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Table 5 Audit status of SMS and DOC on Dec 31, 2009 (MLTM, 2010)
Shipping companies
audited

Ships audited

Audit
organisation

International voyages

137

678

KR

Domestic voyages

128

293

MAFRO

Division

3.3 Challenges faced in Korean shipping society

The seaborne trade and shipbuilding industries have played a pivotal role in the
Korean economy. As of 2016, the total world fleet of the world’s top 30 shipping
countries was recorded as 1,657 million Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT), and Korea
ranked fifth in the world, with a total 85.9 million tons (MOF, 2016). Table 7 shows the
status of Korean Flagged ships. Over the past five years, the overall number of
vessels has remained at a similar level without any big change. However, the number
of vessels of Bare Boat Charter with Hire Purchase (BBC/HP) is increasing.
Regarding the status of licensed and registered vessels in Korea, vessels sailing
coastal waters are registered more than ocean-going vessels. The Table 6 represents
the number of Korean vessels registered and licenced in 2015. The total number of
ships was 3,824; the number of vessels operating in coastal waters was 2,225, and
the number of ocean going vessels was estimated to be 1,599, so that the number of
coastal vessels was higher. Furthermore, except other vessels such as tugs and
barges, conventional cargo vessels were the most registered, followed by tankers.
The conventional ships include general cargo ships and bulk carriers. Moreover, the
number of Korean seafarers employed in Korea is 36,976 as shown in Table 7 below.
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Table 6 Licensed and Registered Vessels in Korea
(Unit: Number, Ton, TEU, 31 Dec, 2015)
Kind of Total
Ships
Number
Classifica of ships Gross Ton
tion

Total
Coastal
Line
Oceangoing
ship
Liner

Passenger
Vessels

Conventional
Container Ship
Cargo Vessels

Number Gross
of ships Ton

Number
of
Gross Ton TEU
ships

Tankers

Others

Number
Number
Number
Gross Ton
Gross Ton
Gross Ton
of ships
of ships
of ships

3,824

64,924,680 145 97,273 1,105

36,652,35
13,583,02
13,340,62
1,251,40
1,215,766 316
662
1,596
3
0
6
7

2,225

1,972,190

536,049

1,599

62,952,490

-

-

840

313

13,461,756

-

-

1

145 97,273 265

-

-

-

246

252,025 1,569

36,116,30
13,583,02
13,088,60
1,215,766 316
416
27
4
0
1
7,589

1,207,263 312

13,454,16
7

-

-

1,086,84
2
164,565

-

-

Irregular
36,108,71
13,088,60
1,286 49,490,734 839
8,503
4 128,853 416
27 164,565
liner
5
1
Note: 1. Based on licensed and registered vessels
2. Passenger ships include reserve ships on subsided remote island route, and others
include barges
3. Includes BBC/HP ships
Source: Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF), Shipping Policy Division

Table 7 Status of the number of seafarers' employment in Korea
(Unit: person, 31 Dec. 2015)
Employment of seafarers

Foreign seafarers
employed in Korea

36,976

24,624

Ocean going vessels

9,307

12,066
70 (passenger vessels)

Costal vessels
Ocean going fishing
vessels
Coastal/inshore
fishing vessels

7,847

673

1,492

3,374

15,328

8,441

3,001

-

Classification
Total

Korean
Flag
vessels

Foreign flag vessels
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According to the statistical yearbook of maritime and fisheries (MOF, 2016), the total
number of domestic vessels registered in 2015 was 2,225, and there were 233
accidents, which was 10.4 percent among the vessels. While 1,599 ocean-going
vessels were registered in the same year, the accident rate was 6.7 percent. As a
result, ocean-going vessels experienced 21 percent fewer accidents than domestic
vessels.
In light of the major causes of ship accidents, it can be ascertained that human
errors are the major factors. Tables 10 and 11 show the causes of accidents that
occurred in domestic and ocean-going vessels, judged by the Korea Maritime Safety
Tribunal (KMST) from 2012 to 2016. There are also several causes of maritime
accidents. Moreover, operational errors, such as improper maintenance of engine
facilities and inappropriate safety procedures, are considered to belong to a category
of human errors. While the rate of accidents caused by human error was 89.2 percent
of 130 cases on ocean-going, as shown in Table 10, it was 93.2 percent of total 266
cases on domestic vessels. Therefore, it is possible to say that maritime accidents
are mainly caused by human error, and it is important to reduce the human errors and
improve human factors to reduce maritime casualties.

Table 8 Comparison of the ratio of accident between domestic vessels and
ocean-going vessels
The number of
registered vessel

The number of
maritime accidents

The Ratio of
registered vessels
to accidents

Domestic vessels

2,225

233

10.4%

Ocean-going
vessels

1,599

107

6.7%
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Table 9 The ratio of the number of registered ships and maritime accidents

Number
Year
The number of registered
vessels (A)
The number of ships
involved in accidents (B)
The number of accidents
Maritime accidents
occurrence rate (B/A)

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

84,466

80,647

77,730

76,500

-

1,854

1,306

1,565

2,362

2,549

1,573

1,093

1,330

2,101

2,307

2.19%

1.62%

2.01%

3.09%

-

Source: Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF), Shipping Policy Division
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Table 10 status of maritime casualties of ocean-going merchant vessels from
2012 to 2016 (Accidents of which judgment were completed by the KMST)
Type of ships
Causes of marine accidents

Passe
nger
ship

Violation of navigation laws and regulations
for avoiding collisions

Cargo
ship

Tanker

tug

sum

5

1

6

12

Failure to comply with general principles for
navigation such as look out, position fixing and
keeping ships’ course

3

34

18

3

58

Inappropriate departure preparation such as
securing
openings,
checking
loading
condition, charts and publications

-

-

-

-

-

Failure to comply with duty orders and
inappropriate report and taking over duties

-

2

-

1

3

Others

1

7

1

-

9

Sum

4

48

20

10

82

Inappropriate maintenance of engine facilities and
spare part

4

7

4

2

17

Inappropriate safety actions for accident prevention on
cargo, fishing and other onboard works

-

6

11

-

17

Inadequate working environments such as rest hours
and measure for preventing dangers

-

-

-

-

-

Safety defects on engine structure and machinery parts

1

1

2

-

4

Inadequate navigational facilities such as traffic routes
and aids to navigation

-

-

-

-

-

Safety defects on electronic appliances and loading and
unloading equipment

1

1

2

-

4

Deficiencies in ship safety management

-

-

-

-

-

Act of God

-

3

-

1

4

others

-

-

1

-

1

Unknown of origins

-

1

-

-

1

Sum

9

67

39

15

130

Operati
onal
failures

Source: KMST (2016)
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Table 11 status of maritime casualties of domestic merchant vessels from
2012 to 2016 (Accidents of which judgment were completed by the KMST)
Type of ships
Causes of marine accidents

Passe
nger
ship

Cargo
ship

Tanker

tug

sum

Violation of navigation laws and regulations for
avoiding collisions

1

2

3

4

10

Failure to comply with general principles for
navigation such as look out, position fixing and
keeping ships’ course

23

31

22

60

136

Inappropriate departure preparation such as
securing
openings,
checking
loading
condition, charts and publications

3

-

-

3

6

1

1

1

3

6

3

-

-

-

3

31

34

26

70

161

Inappropriate maintenance of engine facilities and
spare part

36

5

4

6

51

Inappropriate safety actions for accident prevention on
cargo, fishing and other onboard works

1

6

10

19

36

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

2

4

Inadequate navigational facilities such as traffic routes
and aids to navigation

-

-

-

2

2

Safety defects on electronic appliances and loading and
unloading equipment

1

1

-

2

4

Deficiencies in ship safety management

-

-

1

4

5

Act of God

1

1

-

-

2

others

-

-

1

-

1

Unknown of origins

-

-

-

-

-

72

47

42

105

266

Operati
onal
failures

Failure to comply with duty orders and
inappropriate report and taking over duties
Others
Sum

Inadequate working environments such as rest hours and
measure for preventing dangers
Safety defects on engine structure and machinery parts

Sum

Source: KMST (2016)

Recently, serious marine accidents have been occurring in Korean territorial waters
and the Ocean. On April 16, 2014, the ro-ro ferry, Sewol, capsized 3.1 miles off the
southwest coast of Korea, resulting in 295 deaths and nine missing of 476 passengers.
According to the safety investigation report of the KMST, the direct cause of the
accident was the lack of stability of the ship so that a steep list occurred when the ship
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was trying to change its course. However, immediately after the accident, the crew
did not make enough effort to get passengers to evacuate the listing ship, resulting in
many victims. Also, despite the suggestion of the captain, the company placed
excessive cargo on the ship, usually in favour of operating profit rather than the safety
of the ship (KMST 2014). This is considered to be due to a serious lack of safety
culture because the management had focused on profitability rather than safety and
had not been able to communicate properly with the crew members.
Another example of a major accident that occurred recently is the Wuysan oil spill
accident, caused by an allision with an oil pipe at the Gwangyang oil terminal in Korea.
On December 31, 2014, a VLCC, Wuysan, collided with GS-Caltex Crulde Oil Dolphin,
which is the name of one of the berths at the terminal, due to failing to reduce its
speed as it approached the quay according to the pilot's control for berthing. In the
safety investigation report, the lack of communication between the captain and the
pilot was pointed out as an underlying cause in the social and cultural aspect (KMST
2015).
The occurrence of these major accidents has led to improvements in the maritime
safety system of Korea through amendments of rules and regulations as shown in
Table 12. However, it is doubtful that these strengthened legal systems are sufficient
for maritime safety and prevention of human error. Since the subject of the
implementation of the regime is ultimately the person, it is difficult to discipline human
consciousness and beliefs only through the legal system. Therefore, focusing on
safety culture and preparing measures to enhance human factors should be a direct
path to maritime safety.
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Table 12 Legal improvement after the Sewol accident
edited by the author
Name of the
ship
Improvements
Subsequent
improvements

Ship’s facility

- Strengthen performance standards for cargo
securing devices for car ferries
- 5 % of the maximum number of people on board
the life vest near the muster station
- Revision of ship’s structure for increase of cargo
for car ferries
- Mandatory installation of Voyage Data Recorder
(VDR) for domestic passenger ships over 300
gross ton

Title of
relevant Law

- Standard of the
structure and
facilities of car
ferry
- Ships’ safety Act

Crew
qualification

- Five-year cycle of job aptitude test for captain
working in a car ferry
- The captain and crew must not leave the ship until
the passenger is rescued in an emergency.

- Seafarer Act

Management
system

- Strengthen master’s responsibilities on inspection
of seaworthiness and report to the ship owner
- Ship owner who is noticed with problems from the
inspection shall take necessary measures to safely
operate the ship

- Seafarer Act

Inspection

- Introduction of maritime safety supervisor system
(Unusual check for car ferries)
- Strengthen passenger identification procedures

Organisation

- Revision of government organisation
(Maritime Police Organization absorbed into the
Ministry of Public Safety and Security)

Training

- Establishment of passenger ship job and safety
training
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- Maritime safety
Act
- Shipping Act
-

- Seafarer Act

4.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research method and design appropriateness

Through the review of previous studies in chapter 2, qualitative and quantitative
research methodologies have been used primarily for the evaluation of safety culture,
or it has been studied in a combined way. This study is carried out by a quantitative
method that enables information collection and data analysis in a short period and
use of standardised research methods on the related topic. Therefore, it is said to be
less risky as a traditional way. Furthermore, the safety climate represents the aspect
of safety culture, so measuring cultural aspects of seafarers can reveal the level of
safety culture.
Meanwhile, in other industries such as aviation and nuclear power, research on
safety climate has been carried out to improve safety culture since the 1990s. From
the second half of 2000, several studies have evaluated the safety culture of maritime
employees. However, in Korea, there are not enough studies on the safety culture of
seafarers compared with other countries, and there is no study that verifies the
correlation between the ISM Code and safety culture.
Therefore, this study assesses the safety climate through a quantitative
methodology, targeting seafarers to understand the level of safety culture in the
Korean maritime sector. For the purpose of the study, a questionnaire was developed
based on the factors of safety culture that were extracted from past studies. The study
cited the five safety indicators from Weigman (2002) as a basis for developing a
questionnaire and added two additional indicators required for the safety
management system in the maritime field. These questions were also amended to fit
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the seafarer.
To evaluate the effect of the implementation of the ISM Code on the recognition of
safety culture by seafarers, the survey, using the questionnaire, was administered to
crews employed in ocean going vessels that are fully covered by the ISM Code and
seafarers employed in domestic vessels that are covered by the safety management
system in the Korean domestic Law. Furthermore, the questionnaire was developed
to obtain a high level of reliability and validity to ensure that the safety culture of the
seafarers could be measured properly through a quantitative method, utilising a
survey tool. The survey data was analysed by using the SPSS for the exploratory
factor analysis to verify the reliability and validity of the measurement tool.

4.2 Research model

To investigate the effectiveness of the ISM Code on enhancing safety culture, a
survey on safety culture perceptions of seafarers was conducted. The following figure
(Figure 4) is a research model to achieve the objective of the study. The survey target
was divided into two groups that were comprised of seafarers working on ocean going
vessels and those working on domestic ships. Based on the results of the survey, the
perception of the seven safety culture indicators among the two groups of crew
members was compared and analysed, and the effectiveness of the ISM Code on
safety culture was evaluated.
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Figure 1 Concept of research model

4.3 Development of indicators for assessing safety culture

The study requires the selection of proper indicators for safety cultural
measurements, as the selection influences the validity of the survey result. As a result
of reviewing the relevant literature in the previous Chapters, it was concluded that the
indicators derived from the study of Wiegmann et al. (2003) were suitable as the
safety indicators to be used in this study. This is because Wiegmann et al. (2003) had
selected indicators based on a thorough review of sufficient literature on safety culture
and safety climate. The author believes that these indicators comprehensively cover
the various factors used in other studies (described in Table 3). In addition to the
Wiegmann's indicators, two indicators of learning and communication supplemented
the design of the questionnaire. Therefore, in this study, questionnaire items were
constructed based on seven indicators which are “organisational commitment,
management involvement, reward system, employee empowerment, reporting
system, learning and communication” (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p.11).
- Organisational commitment
It is an indicator of the continued interest and support of management on safety, and
whether safety is a core value in an organisation (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
- Management involvement
It refers to the degree to which management and middle managers participate in
safety activities, and means active monitoring (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
- Reward system
Whether a behaviour is a safe or an unsafe behaviour within an organisation, it is
evaluated and given a reward or punishment consistently according to the
evaluation (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
- Employee empowerment
It includes safety tasks as a way to prevent errors when employees work, the level
of reflection of employees in the safety-related decisions, the pride of employees,
and the responsibility for others (Wiegmann et al. 2002).

- Reporting system
The reporting system allows members to be willing to report their mistakes or near
misses and to share that information. (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
- Learning
It is a proactive approach to monitoring and acquiring information and acquiring
knowledge from the organisation, and it is necessary to be willing to implement
improvements. (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993: Ek, 2006)
- Communication
It is to make good communication in everyday work for proper decision making.
Clear communication must be performed especially for safety culture. (Glendon &
Stanton, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1993: Ek, 2006)

4.4 Relationship between factors of safety culture and ISM code

Although the effectiveness of the ISM Code remains controversial, it has been
found (IMO, 2005) to have a positive effect on safety culture. To understand the direct
relationship between the ISM Code and safety culture, the contents of the eleven
elements constituting the Code were examined and linked to the relevant factors of
safety culture.
As shown in Figure 5, the seven factors of safety culture were found to be
associated with all elements of the Code without any separate concept. In this study,
when the level of perception of the safety culture is quantitatively measured, the
effectiveness of the ISM Code can be predicted in conjunction with the relationship.
When the safety culture of the seafarers is highly perceived, the Code will be expected
to be effective.
Using the measurement tool of the study, the effectiveness of the Code can be
analysed through comparing the level of perception of safety culture of seafarers
employed in ocean going vessels, wherein the ISM Code is applied, to those
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employed in domestic vessels, wherein the safety management system, the simplified
version of the Code, is applied by Korean domestic Law.
Using the measurement tools in this study, it is possible to analyse the effectiveness
of the Code when the consciousness of safety culture of seafarers on ships that apply
and do not apply the ISM Code is measured and compared. In particular, it is possible
to recognise which safety factors have a positive effect on the Code.

Figure 2 Relation between Safety culture factors and the ISM Code

4.5 Research questions and hypotheses

One of the major objectives of the ISM Code is to promote safety culture at sea.
Although it is recognised that the implementation of the ISM Code has contributed to
reducing maritime accidents, it is also true that substantial efforts were needed by
seafarers and staff of shipping companies. At this point - approximately 20 years after
the ISM Code was enforced in shipping - it would be necessary to see how the Code
has contributed to enhancing safety culture and how it affects human behaviour.
According to the ICS (2013), safety culture can improve effectively human
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behaviour through the implementation of an SMS appropriately. Furthermore, the
IMO’s position is that safety culture and safety management are rooted in seafarer’s
professionalism (Havold, 2010). Therefore, to reduce human error, which is the
leading cause of accidents on ships, it is the best way for the seafarers to perform
safety management with professionalism based on safety culture.
The fundamental research question is whether the implementation of the ISM Code
has a positive impact on the safety culture. If the ISM Code contributes to promoting
safety culture, seafarers aboard ships on which the ISM Code is applied would have
a higher awareness of it than those on domestic ships. Under these assumptions, the
main hypothesis was formulated as ‘the perception of the safety culture of seafarers
employed in international sailing vessels is higher than that of seafarers engaged in
domestic vessels”. Furthermore, the sub-hypotheses to be proved in this study are as
detailed in Table 13:
Table 13 Seven hypotheses
H1

The awareness of organisational commitment of seafarers employed on
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H2

The awareness of management involvement of seafarers employed on
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H3

The awareness of reward system of seafarers of seafarers employed on
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H4

The awareness of employ empowerment of seafarers employed on ocean
going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H5

The awareness of reporting system of seafarers employed on ocean going
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H6

The awareness of learning of seafarers employed on ocean going vessels
will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

H7

The awareness of the communication of seafarers employed on ocean going
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.
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4.6 Design of the questionnaire

To measure the safety climate of seafarers, the safety culture indicators and
questionnaire items selected through literature review were revised and edited to fit
the maritime crews. Meanwhile, considering the busy schedules of seafarers, a short
questionnaire was required. Therefore, the questionnaire was comprised of 43
questions because it was necessary to survey the seafarers who were temporarily
trained for a short period. Since seafarers are the subject of the implementation of the
Code, the questionnaire was targeted at merchant officers, including captains and
chief engineers and excluded members of rating and other departments such as the
cooking department.
The studies of Wiegmann et al. (2003) and KTSA (2008) were utilised to develop
the questionnaire items but modified to fit the maritime context. In addition, related to
the learning and communication indicators, which were added, the relevant questions
were prepared using the items that were developed in other studies (ABS, 2012; Song,
2014).
The response was chosen from the 5-point Likert scale, with one as "not at all" and
five as "very agree". Questions by indicators are arranged randomly in the
questionnaire, and to increase the reliability of the response, some of the items were
prepared as negative statements. The survey items are attached in the Appendix B of
this dissertation.
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5. DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents

The survey was conducted from July 20, 2017 to August 18, 2017 at a training
institute in Korea. Seafarers in active service were targeted, and 261 respondents
replied. Excluding the unanswered questionnaires, the questionnaires of 208
respondents were utilised for the analysis. The general characteristics of the
respondents are described in Table 14.
Table 14 General characteristic of the respondents
Division
Total number of respondents
Female
Gender
Male
Senior officers
Rank
Junior officers
1-4 years
5-9 years
Years
10-14 years
of
15-19 years
service
20 – 24 years
More than 25 years
Container
Bulk carrier
Tanker
LNG carrier
Type of
Passenger ship
ship
Car carrier
General cargo
Chemical carrier
Others

Ocean going ships
No
Percent
126
60.6
5
55.6
121
60.8
59
51.8
67
71.3
61
77.2
22
73.3
7
43.8
12
66.7
9
47.4
15
32.6
14
82.4
18
94.7
24
75.0
10
100.0
9
27.3
4
100.0
16
53.3
18
75.0
13
33.3
40

Coastal ships
No
Percent
82
39.4
4
44.4
78
39.2
55
44.4
27
39.2
18
22.8
8
26.7
9
56.3
6
33.3
10
52.6
31
67.4
3
17.6
1
5.3
8
25.0
0
0.0
24
72.7
0
0.0
14
46.7
6
25.0
26
66.7

No
208
9
199
114
94
79
30
16
18
19
46
17
19
32
10
33
4
30
24
39

Total
Percent
100
4.3
95.7
54.8
45.2
38.0
14.4
7.7
8.7
9.1
22.1
8.2
9.1
15.4
4.8
15.9
1.9
14.4
11.5
18.8

All respondents selected were officers, including captains and chief engineers who
are working as managers on vessels. Furthermore, the respondents were
distinguished as seafarers aboard vessels engaged on international voyages (oceangoing seafarers) and seafarers aboard vessels engaged on domestic voyages
(domestic-sailing seafarers). 126 ocean-going seafarers accounted for 60.6 percent
of the total respondents, while 82 domestic sailing seafarers (39. 4 percent) replied.
Regarding gender, only 4.3 percent of the respondents were female officers, which
accounted for a negligible portion.
Regarding the rank, the survey was targeted at both deck officers and engine
officers. Senior officers such as captains, chief engineers, chief officers and 1st
engineers replied, accounting for 54 percent of the total, while junior officers including
2nd officers, 2nd engineers, 3rd officers and 3rd engineers accounted for 45 percent.
Therefore, the response rate of the higher ranking officers was higher than that of
junior officers.
In addition, except for 79 of the respondents (38 percent of respondents), the
remaining respondents have more than five years of work experience, so their work
experience seems to be abundant. The majority of respondents were engaged on
passenger ships, tankers and general cargo ships. In addition, 39 respondents were
engaged on other ships, which include tugboats, and cable laying ships.

5.2 Reliability and validity of measurement instruments

When designing questionnaires and conducting statistical analyses, the reliability
and validity of these measures are considered important for the study. Reliability
analysis is a process required to show the accuracy of the measurement tool, and it
is a process of confirming whether it is accurate and consistently measured by a
survey respondent. Validity also indicates whether a tool is measuring the concept
(Song, 2015).
First, for the reliability measurement, the value of the Cronbach α for internal
consistency is widely used in studies, and a value of 0.6 or more is considered to be
reliable. Therefore, through exploratory factor analysis, the Cronbach α Coefficient for
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each of the items classified by the same factor was identified in the results of the
rotated component matrix by Varimax. The items with low reliability were removed
from all the items, and the measurement was repeated, confirming that all factors
satisfied the reliability test. In the initial 43 items, exploratory factor analysis and
reliability analysis were performed. After removing six items that were considered to
be problematic in reliability, the Cronbach α value of all items was found to be 0.6 or
higher as shown in Table 15.
Table 15 Reliability of measurement items
Items
Indicators

Items

Delated items

Final items

Cronbach α

Organisational
Commitment

Q6, Q3, Q5, Q13,
Q1, Q12, Q43,
Q17

-

Q6, Q3, Q5, Q13,
Q1, Q12, Q43,
Q17

.93

Management
Involvement

Q4, Q7, Q18, Q19,
Q22, Q23

-

Q4, Q7, Q18,
Q19, Q22, Q23

.86

Reward system

Q8, Q9, Q14, Q15,
Q16

Q8

Q9, Q14, Q15,
Q16

.68

Employee
empowerment

Q10, Q11, Q20,
Q21, Q24, Q25,
Q26

Q10, Q24, Q26

Q11, Q20, Q21,
Q25

.70

Reporting system

Q27, Q28, Q29,
Q31, Q32, Q33,
Q36

-

Q27, Q28, Q29,
Q31, Q32, Q33,
Q36

.90

Learning

Q30, Q34, Q35,
Q37, Q38

Q30, Q38

Q34, Q35, Q37

.84

Communication

Q39, Q40, Q41,
Q42, Q2

-

Q39, Q40, Q41,
Q42, Q2

.82

43

6

37

-

Sum of the number

For the purpose of verifying the validity of the measurement instrument, exploratory
factor analysis was conducted. Principal component analysis was used to extract the
constituent factors for the measurement variables, and the orthogonal rotation method
(Varimax) was adopted to simplify factor loading, which refers to the correlation
between each variable and factor. A value of factor loading of 0.4 or greater is
considered a significant variable. Therefore, in this study, items were constructed
based on seven common factors through principal component analysis, and items
with factor loading value of 0.4 or higher were selected. Among 43 items, one item
was removed from the Reward system, three items from the Employee empowerment,
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and two items from Learning were removed, and 37 items were finally selected.
The value of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is a measure of the degree to which the
correlation between variables is explained by other variables. This is used to verify
the suitability of the factor analysis and indicates that a value of 0.8 or higher is
favourable (Song, 2014: Song, 2015). The results of this study showed that the KMO
value was 0.928 and the selection of the variables was satisfactory. As a result of
Bartlett's sphere formation test, the significance probability was less than 0.01, and
the factor analysis model was found to be suitable.
.
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Table 16 Result of the exploratory factor analysis
Factor

Organizational
commitment

Reporting
System

Management
Involvement

Communication

Employee
empowerment

Learning

Reward System

Items

Loading factor

Q6
Q3
Q5
Q13
Q1
Q12
Q43
Q17
Q33
Q29
Q28
Q32
Q27
Q36
Q31
Q22
Q18
Q7
Q4
Q19
Q23
Q40
Q39
Q42
Q41
Q2
Q20
Q11
Q21
Q25
Q34
Q35
Q37
Q16
Q9
Q14
Q15

.819
.788
.780
.774
.743
.736
.651
.642
.772
.751
.736
.708
.687
.643
.641
.716
.682
.665
.649
.642
.601
.784
.739
.714
.666
.535
.692
.658
.620
.543
.785
.684
.633
.750
.670
.642
.563

Commonalitie
s
.764
.710
.653
.746
.724
.735
.723
.612
.664
.649
.684
.640
.680
.696
.657
.752
.610
.652
.644
.546
.550
.655
.655
.667
.615
.485
.585
.616
.454
.520
.733
.746
.748
.666
.578
.637
.492

Eigen
value

Variance

5.660

15.298

4.568

12.346

3.797

10.263

3.339

9.025

2.356

6.367

2.139

5.781

2.083

5.630

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)

0.928

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity

4433.675

Sig. (p<0.001)

0.000
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5.3 Data analysis of safety culture indicators

5.3.1 Overall analysis of the survey result

The mean values of safety culture perception of seafarers working on the ocean
going vessels wherein the Code applied and the coastal going ships wherein the
simplified Code applied by the domestic law was described as shown in Figure 6.
Comparing the average values of perceptions of the seven factors of safety culture,
the mean values of the ocean-going vessels and coastal going vessels were 3.50 and
3.33, respectively. Therefore, the perception of the seafarers employed in ships
engaged on international voyages is higher than the perception of the seafarers
employed in ships engaged in coastal going voyages. Among the seven factors of
safety culture, employee empowerment was the highest in both groups, while the
lowest factors were organisational commitment (3.33) in the group of seafarers
employed in ocean-going vessels and reporting system (2.99) in the group of
seafarers employed in domestic vessels.

Figure 3 Comparisons of perception on safety culture indicators
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Table 17 Comparisons of perception on safety culture indicators
Mean

Divisions
Organisational Commitment
Reporting System
Management Involvement
Communication
Employee Empowerment
Learning
Reward System
Average

Std. Deviation
Ocean-going
Coastal

Ocean-going

Coastal

3.33

3.06

0.84

0.82

3.36
3.38
3.57
4.11
3.88
3.55
3.60

2.90
3.11
3.49
4.13
3.50
3.15
3.33

0.80
0.74
0.67
0.65
0.74
0.48
0.70

0.69
0.81
0.77
0.70
0.78
0.69
0.75

5.3.2 Comparative analysis of average value of safety culture indicators

Comparing the mean difference on each safety culture factor between the two
groups, the remaining six safety culture factors, except employee empowerment,
showed that the perception of seafarers on board ocean going vessels was higher
than the perception of those on domestic ships as shown in Figure 7. Among the
indicators that were above the overall mean value (0.26), the most significant
difference was the reporting system (0.45), followed by the Reward system (0.41),

0.5
0.4

0.45

0.41

0.38
0.26

0.3

0.27

0.2
0.08

0.1
0

-0.01

-0.1

Mean difference between ocean-going seafarers and costal going seafarers
Mean of all differences

Figure 4 Mean differences of safety culture indicators
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Learning (038), Organizational Commitment (0.27), and Management Involvement
(0.26). Therefore, reporting, reward system, learning, organisational commitment, and
management involvement among all safety culture factors could be deemed to be the
five factors of safety culture that have the greatest influence from the application of
the Code.

5.3.3 Analysis of the correlation of the safety culture indicators

A correlation analysis was conducted with the safety culture average (3.49) and
each of the seven safety factors to identify the correlation between the safety culture
and all its factors as shown in Table 18. In the analysis, the closer the value is to ±1,
the higher the correlation has. The closer to 0, the lower the correlation. In general,
if the value is 0.5 or more, the correlation is higher (KTSA, 2008).
Table 18 Correlation analysis of the safety factor and the seven factors
Safety
Culture

Safety
Culture

Pearson
Correlation

Organisational
Commitment

Reporting
System

Management
Involvement

Communi
-cation

Reward
System

Employee
Empowerment

Learning

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

Organisational
Commitment
Reporting
System
Management
Involvement
Communication
Reward
System
Employee
Empowerment
Learning

Pearson
Correlation

.771**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.775**

.595**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.791**

.634**

.646**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.695**

.359**

.413**

.431**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.571**

.408**

.302**

.372**

.260**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.615**

.284*

.312**

.294**

.520**

.318**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Pearson
Correlation

.769**

.481**

.528**

.510**

.525**

.324**

.447**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

1

1

1

1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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1

1

1

Each sub-index showed a high correlation with the average (3.49) of the safety
culture, which indicates that each sub-index is well represented as an element of
safety culture (KTSA, 2008). In particular, the correlation between safety culture and
management involvement (0.791) was the most correlated. It can be said that
management’s interest and involvement are closely related to safety culture.
Furthermore, management involvement was closely correlated with reporting system
(0.646), which had a significant difference between the two groups.

5.4 Hypothesis testing

To test the hypothesis that ocean-going seafarers' awareness of maritime safety
culture is higher than that of coastal going seafarers, an analysis was conducted by
using an independent-sampled t-test on each indicator of maritime safety culture as
shown in Table 19.
As a result of the t-test for the total safety culture (the average of the seven factors)
and the seven sub-indicators, there was statistically a significant difference in the
overall perception of safety culture according to the navigational area (p <0.01). In
other words, there was a difference in the perception of safety culture of the seafarers
of ocean-going vessels and domestic vessels, and the perception of those on ocean
going ships is higher than that of those on domestic ships.

Table 19 the result of independent sampled t-test analysis
Mean
Divisions
Safety culture

Ocean
-going
3.60

Std. Deviation

3.33

Oceangoing
0.55

Coastal

t

p

0.46

3.599

.000

Coastal

Organisational Commitment

3.33

3.06

0.84

0.82

2.304

.022

Management Involvement

3.38

3.11

0.74

0.81

2.535

.012

Reward System

3.15
4.13

0.48

0.69

4.984

.000

Employee empowerment

3.55
4.11

0.65

0.70

-.147

.884

Reporting System

3.36

2.90

0.80

0.69

4.200

.000

Learning

3.88

3.50

0.74

0.78

3.504

.001

Communication

3.57

3.49

0.67

0.77

.789

.431
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There were no statistically significant differences (P> 0.05) in communication and
employee empowerment factors among the seven indicators of maritime safety
culture between two groups.
On the other hand, the perception of the safety culture at sea was different between
the two groups regarding organizational commitment, reporting system, management
involvement, learning and reward system, and seafarers of ocean-going vessels had
a high perception (p <0.05).
According to the result of the T-test, the hypothesis H1 that the recognition of the
crew employed on vessels engaged in international voyages of organisational
commitment is higher than that of those engaged on domestic vessels was adopted
as p <0.05 (p = 0.022) and t = 2.304. Hypothesis H2 on the management involvement
was adopted as p <0.05 (p = 0.12) and t = 2.535. Hypothesis H3 about reward system
was adopted as p <0.01 (p = 0.000) and t = 4.984. However, hypothesis H4 about
employee empowerment was rejected with p> 0.05 (p = 0.884) and t value with -0.147.
Meanwhile, hypothesis H5 about reporting system was adopted as t value of 4.200
for p <0.01 (p = 0.000) and hypothesis H6 about learning was adopted for p <0.01 (p
= 0.001) and t value of 3.504. Finally, hypothesis H7 on communication was rejected
as p> 0.05 (p = 0.431) and t value as 0.789. The results of the hypotheses verification
are shown in Table 20 below.
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Table 20 Testing hypotheses

No

The description of the Hypothesis

Result of
t-test

H1

The awareness of organisation commitment of seafarers
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of
seafarers on domestic vessels.

Adoption

H2

The awareness of management involvement of seafarers
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of
seafarers on domestic vessels.

Adoption

H3

The awareness of reward system of seafarers of seafarers
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of
seafarers on domestic vessels.

Adoption

H4

The awareness of employ empowerment of seafarers employed
on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on
domestic vessels.

Dismissal

H5

The awareness of reporting system of seafarers employed on
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on
domestic vessels.

Adoption

H6

The awareness of learning of seafarers employed on ocean going
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels.

Adoption

H7

The awareness of the communication of seafarers employed on
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on
domestic vessels.

Dismissal
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5.5 Summary of the main results

The basic research question in this study is whether the implementation of the ISM
Code (the Code) positively affects the safety culture awareness of seafarers. To find
the answer, seafarers’ consciousness about safety culture was investigated, and the
result of the survey are as follows.

i)

Dimensions for measuring safety culture

To develop a tool for measuring the safety culture perception of seafarers, the five
factors of safety culture were found based on the study of Weigmann (2003) among
research cases in aviation. Two factors related to the ISM Code and maritime safety
culture were added to these, and a total of seven safety culture factors were derived.
- As a result, the following were obtained: organizational commitment, management
involvement, reporting system, employee empowerment, reward system, learning,
and

communication.

Forty-three

questionnaire

items

for

safety

culture

measurement were selected according to these factors.

ii) Relationship between ISM Code and safety culture
As shown in Figure 5 in Chapter 4, all safety culture factors were closely related to
the elements of the ISM Code, as a result of analyzing the correlation between the
elements of the Code and the seven safety culture factors derived. Therefore, if the
level of safety culture consciousness is high, the implementation of the ISM Code will
be considered effective.

iii) Results of the survey
As a result of analyzing the level of seafarers' perception of safety culture between
the two groups, there were significant differences in five of the safety culture factors,
except for employee empowerment and communication. The seafarers' awareness
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level of the safety culture of ocean-going ships was higher than that of those on
domestic vessels.
- The difference was most significant in the perception of reporting system between
seafarers in ocean-going vessels and those in domestic ships. Reward system,
learning, organizational commitment, and management involvement also showed a
significant difference between the two groups.
- Both groups had the highest level of perception of employee empowerment among
the safety culture factors with a score of 4.0 or higher.
- As a result of correlation analysis between safety culture and its seven factors, it
was found that safety culture has the highest correlation with management
involvement.

iv)

The result based on the t-test to verify hypotheses was acquired as shown in

Table 19.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Discussion of the findings

The main points of this study will be examined based on the results of the
hypotheses verification.
First, they are related to whether the ISM Code is effective in the promotion of safety
culture. Since the implementation of the Code, various studies have been conducted
on its effectiveness. The IMO (2004) and Lappalaine (2016) found that the
implementation of the Code had a positive impact on the formation of a good safety
culture. Through this study, it was quantitatively proved that the safety culture
perception of seafarers on vessels to which the Code is applied is significantly higher
than that of seafarers onboard domestic vessels. Since safety culture and the ISM
system are closely related, it was confirmed that the Code had a positive effect on
promoting safety culture.
Second, regarding the survey results of the seven factors of safety culture, there
were significant differences in the reporting system, reward, and learning system
between both groups at the significance level compared with the overall mean
difference. It also showed that management involvement and organizational
commitment had significant differences. However, there was no significant difference
in employee empowerment and communication. Therefore, it can be seen that the
ISM Code positively affects safety culture, especially the reporting system, reward
system, learning, management involvement, and organizational commitment among
the safety culture factors. Nevertheless, studies of the impact of the Code also pointed
to weakness in employee empowerment and communication. Bhattacharya (2009)
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found that since the implementation of ISM, there has been a lack of communication
related to safety issues between shore and ship and that the Code has not had a
significant effect on communication. Furthermore, Bhattacharya (2012) indicated that
“employee participation in the management of shipboard safety were largely absent
in the maritime context.” As a result, it is proven quantitatively that the effectiveness
of the ISM Code on employee empowerment and communication is not significant.
Therefore, the ISM Code affects partially the promotion of safety culture.
Third, in relation to the suitability of the survey tool for safety culture measurement,
the results obtained in this study and the results of other studies on safety culture
measurements performed in the aeronautical field are compared, although the validity
and reliability of the tool were already examined in Chapter 5. When comparing the
results of the study of KTSA (2008) based on the five factors of safety culture
(Weigmann et al., 2002) and the average of the result of this study (3.41), the average
value of the perception of safety culture of aviation pilots working in Korean airlines
was measured to be 3.40, and that of American pilots was measured to be 3.60.
Similar results were obtained when compared with the aeronautical measurement
results. Therefore, it is considered that the safety culture measurement tool applied in
this study is appropriate.
Fourth, through the analysis of the correlation between factors of safety culture, it
was confirmed that management involvement and reporting system are the most
influential factors in safety culture. Management's interest and participation in ship
operations and safety activities will be the most important factor in promoting ship
safety culture. This is also consistent with the study of KTSA (2008), which identified
management involvement as an important factor in building a good safety culture.
Meanwhile, in relation to the reporting system, there should be an atmosphere that
encourages reporting of the errors and problems in the ship voluntarily and without
difficulties at the employee level.
Finally, regarding the level of recognition of safety culture of Korean seafarers,
employee empowerment was the highest among factors of safety culture, and there
was no significant difference in the perceptions of the seafarers. Employee
empowerment is mainly the responsibility of the seafarers and the fulfilment of
authorities. According to Kim (2013), the characteristics of Korean seafarers were
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basically "affection to others," and Confucian customs have a great influence on the
consciousness of the seafarer. In other words, it is a characteristic of Korean seafarers
that hierarchical order is emphasized. The results of the survey showed that these
characteristics were well demonstrated. The items with a score of 4.0 or higher were
“I want to be respected by other crews through safety activities” and “I have to do
everything I can to prevent accidents.” Employee empowerment relates to the unique
national character of Koreans, and the evaluation result is considered to be of a high
level. Therefore, it can be seen that the dominant safety culture characteristic of
Korean seafarers is employee empowerment resulting from a strong sense of
responsibility.

6.2 Conclusion

This study began with questions in the relevant academic dispute over the
effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture. To prove the proposition that the ISM
Code has a positive effect on safety culture, a qualitative study was conducted. Since
the development of a scale to measure seafarer perception of safety culture was
required, the concept of safety culture and safety climate and the factors for forming
a good safety culture were explored. In this process, it was possible to select the
seven factors of safety culture, which are organizational commitment, management
involvement, employee empowerment, reporting system, learning, reward system,
and communication. The questionnaire items were developed to target seafarers
through a review of past literature and research. In addition, an analysis of the
relationship between the elements of the ISM Code and factors of safety culture was
conducted, and it was confirmed that these seven safety culture factors are closely
related to elements in the ISM Code.
In the result of the survey of Korean seafarers, the perception of safety culture of
seafarers engaged in ocean-going vessels where the ISM Code applied is higher than
that of those in domestic vessels where the simplified ISM Code is applied. There
were significant differences in recognition among the safety factors except for two:
employee empowerment and communication. For the five factors that differed, the
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seafarers on international vessels had higher perception than those on domestic
vessels. In particular, the reporting system, reward system, and learning showed great
differences between the two groups, and the ISM Code was found to be the most
effective for these factors. As for employee participation and communication, there
was no difference between the two groups, and it was found that the ISM Code was
not effective for these factors. This is consistent with other studies (Bhattacharya,
2012; Lappalainen, 2016). Furthermore, among the safety culture factors, it is
possible to recognize that the unique characteristics of Korean seafarers are
employee empowerment, which means active participation in safety-related
shipboard work and employee responsibility for safety.
Through this study, it will be possible to establish measures to promote safety
culture. As the rate of Korean domestic vessel accidents is higher than that of
international voyages, it is necessary to identify vulnerable elements of safety culture
and strengthen safety management. Based on the results of the study, a more
effective way to promote safety culture would be if the maritime education system and
safety management system related to the reporting system and the reward system,
which have low recognition levels compared to seafarers working on international
vessels, would be improved.
To prevent maritime accidents, efforts should be made to improve maritime safety
culture. Furthermore, it is necessary to grasp the level of awareness of the present
safety culture so that more concrete improvement measures will be prepared. In the
meantime, safety culture has been recognized, and safety systems and regulations
have been improved following the occurrence of major disasters. What is required for
safety enhancement is an empirical study on safety culture with a concrete approach.
Through this study, appropriate tools for maritime safety culture measurement were
developed for seafarers. This study was able to quantitatively measure the perception
of safety culture, meaning that the effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture
can be verified as an empirical study.
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6.3 Limitation and further studies

In this study, the seafarers were classified into two groups: those employed in
vessels sailing on international voyages and those employed in ships sailing on
domestic voyages. However, Zohar (2000) suggested that when measuring safety
culture, a single organization or a group should be analyzed or compared. Chouhry,
Fang and Mohamed (2007) noted that safety culture research needs to be aware of
whether selected groups or organizational levels truly represent natural groups with a
relatively homogeneous culture. As safety culture is based on the common
consciousness of the members of an organization, a limitation of this study is that
seafarers belonging to various ship types and shipping companies are set as one
group. In a follow-up study, it is necessary to develop a safety culture measurement
method by narrowing the research subjects to one organization or one ship type.
In addition, this study evaluated the consciousness level of safety culture of the
crew quantitatively through questionnaires. As a result, the interpretation of the
questionnaire could not be conducted through in-depth interviews with the same
seafarers who responded to the questionnaire. For a comprehensive conceptual
approach to studying safety culture, qualitative research methods should be carried
out with quantitative research methods (Guldenmund, 2000). Therefore, in future
research, it will be necessary to introduce the interview technique in parallel with
questionnaires to get more in-depth results.
The third issue is related to whether the ISM Code is the only factor that creates a
difference in the safety culture consciousness level of seafarers. In reality, there are
many potential complexities for seafarers regarding education level, salary level,
welfare level, and job consciousness. In this study, there is a limitation that only the
navigation area is classified, and only matters concerning the application of the ISM
Code are evaluated.
Future research will need to study how to use the results of safety culture
measurement. To promote safety culture effectively, it is necessary to conduct further
studies to develop the methods to be applied to the ships, for instance, promotions,
education, and training system.
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APPENDIX A

Survey result arranged by indicators
Questionnaire items

Organisational
commitment

Management
involvement

Reward
system

Mean
Ocean Coastal

Q.1 Following safety procedures is consistently expected.

3.94

3.38

Q.3 Management doesn’t show much concern for safety until there
is an accident or incident.*

3.45

2.95

Q.5 If work is busy, safety work may not work well.*

3.05

2.94

3.37

3.13

3.34

3.13

2.94

2.78

3.22

2.99

Q.43 Management does all it can to prevent accidents or incidents.

3.35

3.18

Average

3.33

3.06

Q.4. Management involvement in safety issues has a high priority
at my company.

3.55

3.17

Q.7 My company’s safety department is doing a good job.

3.52

3.13

Q.18 Upper level management gets personally involved in safety
activities.

2.95

2.85

Q.19 Safety standards are seldom discussed openly.*

3.33

3.13

Q.22 Management is receptive to learning about safety concerns.

3.79

3.27

Q.23 Managers does not hesitate to approach masters or crew
members to discuss safety issues.

3.15

3.07

Average

3.38

3.11

3.90

3.38

3.43

3.21

3.31

2.87

3.56

3.13

3.55

3.15

Q.6 Management tries to get around safety requirements
whenever they get a chance.*
Q.12 Management is willing to invest money and effort to improve
safety.
Q.13 Management is more concerned with making money than
being safe.*
Q.17 My company does not cut corners where safety is concerned.

Q9 Management negatively evaluates crew members who behave
recklessly.
Q14 Safe crew members’ performance is evaluated using clear
standards.
Q15. Crew members who cause accidents or incidents are not
held sufficiently accountable for their actions.*
Q.16 Action is consistently taken against crew members who
violate safety procedures or rules.
Average
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Mean
Ocean Coastal

Questionnaire items
Employee
empowerm
ent

Reporting
system

Learning

Communic
ation

Q11. The best officer or master or chief engineer in the group expect
other crews to behave safely.

4.08

4.15

Q20. Crews do all they can to prevent accidents.

4.37

4.32

3.88

3.84

4.11

4.20

4.04

4.12

3.64

3.16

3.82

3.12

3.00

2.57

3.41

3.00

3.47

2.94

Q33. There is no point in reporting a near miss.*
Q36. I am satisfied with the way this company deals with safety
reports.
Average
Q34. I think support for education is very valuable.
Q35. The issue of safety is shared by all crew members as a best
practice through review and analysis.
Q37. Safety system (issues) is improved based on past experiences,
news related the safety issue or recognized solution.
Average

2.87

2.48

3.28

3.06

3.36

2.90

4.26

3.76

3.76

3.44

3.62

3.32

3.88

3.50

Q2. There is good communication on this ship about safety issues.

3.72

3.57

Q39. I always give proper instructions when I initiate any work.
Q40. I can tell my straightforward thoughts without fear of being
subjected to retaliatory measures.
Q41. I always ask questions if I do not understand the instructions
given to me, or I am unsure of the relevant safety precautions.
Q42 There is mutual trust between the manager and crew based on
honesty and truthfulness.
Average

3.67

3.60

3.30

3.32

3.76

3.54

3.37

3.40

3.57

3.49

Q21. Management ensures that all crews are responsible and
accountable for safe operation.
Q25. It is important for me to operate safely if I am to keep the respect
of other crews in my ship.
Average
Q27. I am familiar with the system for formally reporting safety issues
in my company.
Q28. Safety issues raised by crews are communicated regularly to
all crews in the company.
Q29. Crews hesitate to report minor injuries and incidents.*
Q31. When a crew member reports a safety problem, management
acts quickly to correct safety issues.
Q32. Crews who raise safety concerns are seen as troublemakers.*
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
This is a questionnaire for measuring the climate on board. All materials will be used
for research purposes and will be anonymized. Therefore, please read the question,
and I would appreciate it if you would like to be honest.

<Personal information>
1. What is your rank?
□

Captain

□ Chief Officer

□ 2nd Officer

□ 3rd Officer

□

Chief Engineer

□ 1st Engineer

□ 2nd Engineer

□

3rd Engineer

□ Others (

)

2. Gender
□

□ Male

Female

3. Type of ships
Container
□ Bulk carrier □ Oil tanker
□
LNG carrier □
Passenger ship
□
Car carrier □
General cargo □
Chemical carrier
□
others
□
4. Navigational service area
Ocean going voyage □

Domestic voyage □

5. Years of work experience at sea
(

)years

6. Ship tonnage – the latest ship
100- 499 G/T
□
2000- 5000 G/T □
30000- G/T
□

500 – 1000 G/T □
5000-10000 G/T □

1000- 2000 G/T □
10000 – 30000 G/T □

7. Have you experienced an accident or incident? Yes □

No □

Yes □

No □

8. Have you experienced a near miss?
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Please answer the following questions, by checking one
number from one to five.
1

Following

safety

procedures

is

consistently

expected.
2

There is good communication on this ship about
safety issues.

3

Management doesn’t show much concern for
safety until there is an accident or incident.

4

Management involvement in safety issues has a
high priority at my company.

5

If work is busy, safety work may not work well.

6

Management

tries

to

get

around

safety

requirements whenever they get a chance.
7

My company’s safety department is doing a good
job.

8

Disagr
ee

Disagr
ee
slightl
y

Netual

Agree
slightl
y

Agr
ee

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

Being involved in an accident or incident has an
adverse effect on a seafarer’s future with this
company.

9

Management negatively evaluates crew members
who behave recklessly.

10

Crew members are seldom asked for input when
safety

procedures

or

other

guideline

are

developed or changed.*
11

The best officer or master or chief engineer in the
group expect other crews to behave safely.

12

Management is willing to invest money and effort
to improve safety.

13

Management is more concerned with making
money than being safe.

14

Safe crew members’ performance is evaluated
using clear standards.
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15

Crew members who cause accidents or incidents
are not held sufficiently accountable for their

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

actions.
16

Action is consistently taken against crew members
who violate safety procedures or rules.

17

My company does not cut corners where safety is
concerned.

18

Upper level management gets personally involved
in safety activities.

19

Safety standards are seldom discussed openly.

20

Crews do all they can to prevent accidents.

21

Management

ensures

that

all

crews

are

responsible and accountable for safe operation.
22

Management is receptive to learning about safety
concerns.

23

Managers does not hesitate to approach masters
or crew members to discuss safety issues.

24

Crews try to get around safety requirements
whenever they get a chance.

25

It is important for me to operate safely if I am to
keep the respect of other crews in my ship.

26

27

Crews often encourage one another to work safely.
I am familiar with the system for formally reporting
safety issues in my company.

28

Safety issues raised by crews are communicated
regularly to all crews in the company.

29

Crews hesitate to report minor injuries and
incidents.

30

Crews are given enough training to perform their
work safely.
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31

When a crew member reports a safety problem,
management acts quickly to correct safety issues.

32

Crews who raise safety concerns are seen as
troublemakers.

33

There is no point in reporting a near miss.

34

I think support for education is very valuable.

35

The issue of safety is shared by all crew members
as a best practice through review and analysis.

36

I am satisfied with the way this company deals with
safety reports.

37

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

①

②

③

④

⑤

Safety system (issues) is improved based on past
experiences, news related the safety issue or
recognized solution.

38

If you have reported concerns on ship’s safety, you
feel measures are not taken within reasonable
time

39

I always give proper instructions when I initiate any
work.

40

I can tell my straightforward thoughts without fear
of being subjected to retaliatory measures.

41

I always ask questions if I do not understand the
instructions given to me, or I am unsure of the
relevant safety precautions.

42

There is mutual trust between the manager and
crew based on honesty and truthfulness.

43

Management does all it can to prevent accidents
or incidents
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